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ABSTRACT
This study examines the determinants of inter-organisational trust by using survey data from
just over 1000 suppliers in the automotive industry. We define trust and derive a model of its
determinants from transaction cost economics, game theory and sociological exchange theory.
Regression analysis results indicate that determinants of trust are different from determinants of
opportunism. US-Japanese differences are found in three respects: (i) the way trust is
conceptualised by suppliers is richer in Japan than in the US; (ii) the level of trust is higher in
Japan than in the US; and (iii) the factors facilitating trust and those attenuating opportunism
differ in the US and Japan.
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‘The advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another penetrates into every crevice and
cranny of human life.’ (J S Mill 1891, p.68) -
‘Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.’
(Arrow 1975, p.24)
1. INTRODUCI’ION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Recent work on trust between business organizations focuses on the possibility of
using it to enhance competitive advantage (Barney and Hansen 1994, Jarillo 1988, Mohr and
Spekman 1994). In fact, an increasing number of studies exhort companies to build trust with
their business partners (e.g. Dodgson 1993, SMMT & DTI 1994). However, trust is
sometimes understood to be a by-product of norms, embedded in social networks and rarely
brought about through rational-instrumental means (Granovetter 1985). Even if trust could be
cultivated intentionally, it is regarded as a scarce commodity which only a few can afford
(Gambetta 1988, 224pp.). Before an explicit strategy of developing and maintaining trust can
be considered feasible, the determinants of trust must be identified. This paper is a stepping
stone towards developing a strategic framework for trust. It combines the strength of the
economics discipline which has focused on how trust may be created deliberately, and that of
the psychology discipline which has endeavored to develop a reliable survey technique for
measuring trust. The empirical part of the paper is based on a large scale survey of automotive
parts suppliers in the United States and Japan.
Inter-organisational trust may enhance organizational performance in a number of
ways. For instance, trust enables a network of firms to adapt to unforeseen circumstances
which are common in a world of risk and uncertainty, thus reducing transaction costs (Jarillo
1988). Also, trust is said to promote suppliers’ willingness to invest in customer-specific and
general assets (Dyer forthcoming). But while theoretical work abounds, empirical work on the
link between trust and performance has been rare. In empirical work, as in theory, it is
opportunism rather than trust which has attracted more attention (e.g. Anderson 1988).
Moreover, opportunism or trust tend not to be measured directly; these features are instead
assumed to be present in transactions with certain characteristics such as specific assets (Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian 1978) or long-term trading (Gulati 1995). Therefore, we believe that
the operationalization of trust is an important task.
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The central concept explored in this paper is mutual trust between a customer and a
supplier organization. Trust is an expectation held by an agent that its trading partner will
behave in a mutually acceptable manner (including an expectation that neither party will exploit
the other’s vulnerabilities). This expectation narrows the set of possible actions, thus reducing
the uncertainty surrounding the partner’s actions. In discussing the notion of mutual trust,
however, we focus on situations in which each party can take alternative courses of action.
Thus, predictability in behavior exists for different reasons arising from a ‘freewill’ choice
when agents are confronted with different alternatives, not because of severe constraints which
force them to stick to a single possible course of action. Sako ( 1991, 1992) used these different
reasons to distinguish between three types of trust ‘contractual trust’ (will the other party carry
out its contractual agreements?), ‘competence trust’ (is the other party capable of doing what it
says it will do?), and ‘goodwill trust’ (will the other party make an open-ended commitment to
take initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from unfair advantage taking?).
The study of inter-personal trust has a long history within the psychology discipline
(e.g. Deutsch 1958; Rotter 1967; see Clark 1993 for a good literature survey). Much progress
has been made in developing reliable attitudinal measures of trust (Cook and Wall 1980; Cook
et al 1991). But in the context of business organizations, this focus on psychology is deficient.
In particular, while psychologists tend to study inter-personal trust, business firms are
concerned just as much with inter-organizational trust. It is the latter which might survive a
breakdown of inter-personal relationships due to labor turnover or personality clash, and which
provides the stability necessary for firms to pursue innovative and competitive activities. For
this reason, the determinants of inter-personal and inter-organizational trust may well be
different (Barney and Hansen 1994), although similar methods may be applied to analyze
(Smith, Carroll and Ashford 1995).
Recently, Williamson (1993) has objected to the increasingly popular notion of
them
‘calculative trust’ which is an assessment of the expected benefits and costs of cooperation. He
called for the restriction of the usage of the term ‘trust’ to personal trust only, a situation in
which Williamson assumes no monitoring wcurs. Here, he appears to conflate the absence of
continuous calculation with the absence of monitoring. In inter-organizational trust, as in some
marriages and friendships, trust tends to be associated with periodic intense mutual observation
(Sahel, 1992 & 1994, Lorenz 1993). But this does not necessarilyimplythatall firms are
always calculating benefits and costs of each action they take with respect to another firm.
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Despite Williamson’s concerns, the concept of interorganizational trust is widely used
in both the marketing and the strategy literature. For examples of empirical work see Zaheer
and Venkatraman (1995), Parkhe (1993), Anderson and Weitz (1989), Morgan and Hunt
(1994), Kumar, Sheer, and Steenkamp ( 1995), Ganesan ( 1994), and Cummings and Bromiley
(1996). The scales used by these authors to measure trust meet conventional criteria of
validity, such as internal consistencey and face validity. In addition, Gulati (1995) fktds that
firms act as if they gain trust in each other overtime; firms which have engaged in alliances
with each other before are less likely to use equity, “since interflrm trust based on prior
alliances reduces the imperative to use equity”.
There is also a good deal of case-study evidence that interorganizational trust can
survive the departure of the individuals who initially established the relationship. One, Adachi
and Odaka (1988) describe the close ties that bind Toyota and its long-term suppliers. Eccles
(198 1) shows that participants in the US construction industry have repeated dealings with
each other, dealings which are governed by trust rather than by legaIly-enforceable guarantees.
Similar arrangements are also found in other areas, such as the “Third Italy” (Brusco 1986),
the Japanese textile industry (Dore, 1983), and the Japanese electronics industy (Sako 1992).
In organizational studies, it has been common to focus on determinants of ‘governance
structures’ or ‘governance mechanisms’ (such as markets VShierarchies and intermediate
modes including long-term contracts, joint ventures and other forms of alliances) (Heide and
John 1990, Joskow 1988, Walker and Weber 1984). Trust or opportunism enter into some of
these analyses as either one of the determinants of governance structures or a governance
structure in itself. As an example of the former, trust is a social norm which lessens the need
to use hierarchy to attenuate opportunism. Thus, the higher the general level of trust, the less
need there is for vertical integration (Williamson 1985) or equity-holding (Gulati 1995). Here,
trust tends to be conceptualised as a substitute for various governance mechanisms. Also, trust
may be a society-wide norm or a noxtn which develops in dyadic relationships. As an example
of the latter, ‘governance by trust’ is an informal control mechanism which enhances the
effectiveness of transactions whether they take place in markets or within a hierarchy (Smitka
199 1). This conceptualization introduces the possibility that trust may complement, rather than
substitute for, hierarchy or market (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Srnitka 1992). However, unlike
equity holding or long-term written contracts, interorganizational trust as a form of governance
remains ill-defined because it is less tangible and more informal. It has been noted that
difficulties in defining the presence or absence of trust in a consistent manner have caused
much misunderstanding both within and between disciplinary fields (Hosmer 1995).
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In economics, the interest in trust has come from a ratheroblique angle, mainly from
two theoretical perspectives, transaction cost economics and game theory. In transaction cost
economics, opportunism (self-interest seeking with guile), rather than trust, has been a central
concept. In designing organizations, the reliance on trust is seen to be too fragile as compared
to devising safeguards against opportunism (Williamson 1985, p.64). Opportunistic behavior
is said to be irresistible for parties encountering a cocktail of specific assets and uncertainty.
Vertical integration or obligational contracting is put forward as an optimal ‘governance
structure’ for attenuating such behavior (Williamson 1979). Attenuating opportunism,
however, is not the same as attaining mutual trust, as will be shown in this paper.
In game theory, economists are interested in the evolution of cooperation. Even self-
interested agents will cooperate if they expect a positive pay-off from cooperation, a situation
more likely with repeated encounters over an infinite or uncertain time horizon than in one-time
transactions (Kreps 1990). However, cooperation cannot be equated with trust. This is
because cooperation may emerge where no trust exists (Axelrod 1984). Also, trust as a
subjective state of mind may not have a straightforward linear relationship to cooperation or
trust as manifested in behavior (Kee and Knox 1970).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a conceptual framework for
defining trust and analyzing its determinants, by borrowing approaches from economic,
sociological and psychological theories. This framework is used to develop a number of
hypotheses. Section 3 reports the results of factor analysis used to create composite measures
of trust, and regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Section 4 concludes by drawing
theoretical and empirical implications of this study.
2. CONCEPTUAL FM.MEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Differentiating Trust and Opportunism
In this paper, we conceptualize trust to be not a mere opposite of opportunism. This is
due to a distinction we make among different types of trust, following Sako (1992). A
precondition for trust of the contractual and goodwill types is the absence of opportunistic
behavior. However, lack of opportunism is not a sufficient condition for goodwill trust. For
example, a supplier that withholds a vital piece of technical information is acting
opportunistically according to the goodwill trust definition but not in the strict contractual
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sense. This amounts to fulfilling the letter, but not the spirit, of the contract. Thus, there
seems to be a hierarchy of trust, with fulfilling a minimal set of obligations constituting
‘contractual trust’, and honoring a broader set constituting ‘goodwill trust’. A move from
contractual trust to goodwill trust involves a gradual expansion in the congruence in beliefs
about what is acceptable behavior. As one goes higher up the hierarchy, also, a looser form of
reciprocity applies between the trading partners. Reciprocation may take a broader range of
forms, and more time may elapse between the receipt of a favor and its return (Gouldner
1960).
Such reciprocity gives grounds for arguing that trust is a mutually self-enforcing set of
expectations (Fox 1974, Zand 1972), so that it is not possible for a customer to continue to
trust a supplier forever if the supplier starts to distrust the customer. In fact, a research design
which allowed for asking two sides of a relationship whether each trusted the other gives
evidence of such mutual trust (Currall and Judge forthcoming). Conceptually, however, the
customer’s trust of the supplier is separate from the supplier’s trust of the customer. The
empirical work in this paper is mainly about tie supplier’s trust of its customer.
2.2 Conditions for Facilitating Trust and Attenuating Opportunism
The main tasks of this paper are to operationalize the concept of trust, and to determine
conditions which facilitate the creation and maintenance of trust. We believe that they
constitute an important contribution to the study of determinants of governance structures.
The following hypotheses concern eight sets of factors which are thought to facilitate
the creation and maintenance of trust between a customer and a supplier. Because the survey
results reported in this paper focus on suppliers’ trust of customers, the hypotheses will be in
terms of this. Suppliers’ perception of customer opportunism is hypothesized to be distinct
from suppliers’ trust of customers. Some conditions may prevent opportunism but do not
necessarily foster trust, while other factors which enhance trust do not necessarily constitute a
safeguard against opportunism. Moreover, we expect all the following hypotheses to be more
significant in cases where customers are free to choose from alternative courses of action than
when they are constrained, for example, by the lack of alternative suppliers in the marketplace.
Characteristics of the bilateral relationship are dealt with first before moving on to wider
environmental and institutional conditions.
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Vertical intimation and written contrac ts -
Financial vertical integration is one solution given by transaction cost economists to
attenuating the effects of supplier opportunism. In theory, integration gives the principal (the
customer) better control and ability to monitor the agent’s (the supplier’s) behavior. In this
sense, vertical integration is considered a substitute for ‘governance by trust’ (Smitka 1991);
where there is control via integration, there is no need to rely on trust to coordinate activities.
But in reality, vertical integration in itself has not assured better internal administrative
coordination. For example, General Motors has not been able to persuade its internal divisions
(and in particular its most formidable Fisher Body Division) to share cost information within
the corporation (Helper 1991, pp.803-4). Transaction cost economics has focused on vertical
integration attenuating the agent’s (supplier’s) opportunism. Therefore, it is not at all clear that
the princiDal’s own opportunism is attenuated by the principal’s integration of the supplier.
The customer’s ownership of suppliers maybe interpreted by the latter as a form of
credible commitment for long-term relationship, which in turn may lead to the absence of
opportunistic behaviour by the customer (Williamson 1983). But vertical integration has not
stopped the closure or selling off of component divisions by the Big Three in the US. Such
recent US experience militate against the case for vefiical integration attenuating customer
opportunism. Thus, we may hypothesize that:-
H 1A: Suppliers’ trust of customers is not significantly affected by the degree to which
they are vertically integrated by their customer, other things being equal.
H 1B: Suppliers’ perception of customer opportunism is not significantly affected by the
degree to which they are vertically integrated by their customer, other things being
equal.
Another governance structure is the long-term written contract. Long-term contracts
may reduce the expectations of opportunistic behavior, but may not necessarily enhance trust.
In fact where there is trust in a relationship, long-term written contracts are superfluous to the
viability of the relationship. According to one strand of thinking (e.g. Kawash.ima 1967),
appeal to legal authorities in itself introduces not only rigidity but suspicion into a relationship.
However, some researchers (e.g. Lane and Backman 1996; Sitkin and Roth 1993) argue on the
contrary that law may help strengthen the foundation upon which trust cart grow under certain
circumstances. While a general procedural legal framework may be conducive to the creation
7
of trust, the substance of a business contract is typically left implicit or open-ended because of
the benefit of flexibility such a contract affordi in dealing with unforeseen circumstances. We
can therefore hypothesize about opportunism but not about trust because contracts tend to be
regarded as safeguards. Thus,
H 1C: The longer the duration of written contracts, the lower the supplier’s expectation
of customer opportunism, other things being equal.
Lo _ ermn~-t trading and future exoe ctation s of Customer commitmen[
According to Axelrod ( 1984), it is the expectation of long-term commitment into the
future -- what he calls ‘enlarging the shadow of the future’ -- rather than the record of long-
term trading, which matters in making trading partners cooperate with each other (see also
Heide and John 1990). Expectations of repeated transactions have led even litigious American
business firms to rely on ‘relational contracting’ (Macaulay, 1963, Mcneil 1978). To the extent
that trust is built by demonstrating trustworthiness over time, the historical duration of a
relationship may also matter. That is, expectations of continuity may be induced by past
association.
H2A: The longer the informal commitment made by the customer to continue trading
with the supplier, the higher is the supplier’s trust for its customer.
H2B: The longer the duration of past trading, the higher is the supplier’s trust of its
customer.
Recirmcitv in info@on excb
Sharing of information facilitates coordination between organizations. But disclosing
proprietary or confidential information to the other party, that is acting as if one trusted the
other, exposes one’s vulnerability. In this situation, a two-way flow of information is essential
‘+~ and sustaining trust, which feeds on a loose form of reciprocity overtime. One-
flformation -- for example, a supplier being asked to provide information about its
cess steps without the customer being more open about its future business plan --
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is likely to be regarded with suspicion by the supplier as a sign of increased control.
Information asymmetry resulting from one-way flow of information also gives much scope for
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1975).
H3A: The more suppliers’ disclosure of information to their customer is matched by the
customer’s provision of information to suppliers, the higher the supplier’s trust for its
customer.
H3B: The more suppliers are asked to provide information to their customer without the
customer reciprocating by giving information to suppliers, the greater the supplier’s
perception of customer opportunism.
Interdependence and asset mecificitv
Axelrod ( 1984) wrote about the importance of perceived interdependence for
cooperation to evolve. A deliberate strategy of locking oneself into a relationship, thus raising
switching costs, may facilitate the creation and maintenance of trust. Investment in assets
dedicated to the other party makes mutual commitment to the relationship credible, thus
enhancing trust, particularly if both parties have equally good alternatives to turn to.
This proposition is in stark contrast to Williamson’s earlier argument that in a situation
of bilateral monopoly, ‘it is in the interest of each party to seek terms most favorable to him,
which encourages opportunistic representations and haggling’ (Williamson 1975, p. 27). In
contrast, in a situation with large numbers of bidders, ‘parties who attempt to secure gains by
strategic posturing will find, at the contract renewal interval, that such behavior is nonviable.’
More recently, however, transactions cost theorists including Williamson (1983)
himself, have argued that the establishment of ‘credible commitments’ or ‘hostages’ can bind
the parties to trustworthy behavior even while it creates bilateral monopoly. Empirical support
for this idea is provided by Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Heide and John (1990).
H4A: The greater the level of customer specific assets possessed by the supplier and the more
difficult it is for the customer to switch away from the supplier, the higher the supplier’s trust
in its customer.
H4B: The greater the level of customer-specific assets possessed by the supplier, the higher the
supplier’s perception of customer opportunism.
Technical assistance
One type of credible commitment that a customer can provide to a supplier is technical
assistance, since the customer receives no return on its investment in training if it fires the
supplier. In addition, the customer would have more trust in its suppliers’ competence as a
result. To the extent that the customer demonstrates knowledge and skills by providing
technical assistance, it enhances suppliers’ ‘competence trust’ of the customer. Over time,
particularly if technical assistance is not fully paid for, suppliers would interpret it as a
manifestation of commitment by the customer, and may become a basis for ‘goodwill trust’
(&dco 1992).
In the automobile industry, it is typically the customer which has greater market power
in relation to its suppliers. Where there is such differential power between the customer and
the supplier, the initiative taken by the more powerful partner -- the customer -to commit to a
relationship before receiving guarantees of trust from the weaker partner is conducive to the
creation of trust. By contrast, the weaker partner may feel too vulnerable to make a
commitment without immediate reciprocation from the stronger partner. A weaker partner is
therefore more grateful for a show of commitment through technical assistance. At the same
time, technical assistance provides no protection against opportunism, and therefore we cannot
hypothesize about opportunism in this respect.
H5A: The more technical assistance is provided by the customer, the higher the
supplier’s trust in the customer.
H5B: The smaller the supplier is relative to the customer, the more trmting the supplier
is for a given level of technical assistance.
Uncertainty
Unpredictability in business environments makes opportunism difficult to control
because a firm, either customer or supplier, would find it difficult to write fully contingent
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contracts (Williamson 1975). However, at the same time, the greater the degree of
environmental uncertainty, the greater the benefit from being able to trust a trading partner,
because trust facilitates decision-making in unanticipated circumstances. Here, it may be useful
to make a distinction between behavioral uncertainty (the source of which is the customer who
may increase the degree of uncertainty by behaving in an unpredictable and/or opportunistic
manner) and environmental uncertainty (the source of which is other than the customer, such as
the cost of raw materials or the future trajectory of new technology). Environmental uncertainty
creates a scope for opportunism when there are relation-specific investments (Walker and
Weber 1984). However, behavioral uncertainty is reduced when opportunism is contained.
One source of uncertainty in the latter category arises from the technical complexity of
the product being made by suppliers. The more complex the product, the harder it would be to
write complete contingent contracts before orders are placed, and consequently the greater the
@ for trading partners to rely on trust. However, although the advantage of having
trustworthy partners may be greater, the actual manifestation of trust for different levels of
product complexity cannot be hypothesized.
H6A: The more uncefiain the market and technology environments, and the higher the
degree of asset specificity, the greater the level of customer opportunism.
National cultural values. business norms and mst inves~ent into trust
Trust between trading partners may vary not only with the attributes of transaction but
also with the trading environment in which they are a part. Here, societal culture, politics,
regulation, professionalisation, networks and corporate culture are said to be a relevant set of
attributes in which a bilateral relationship may be embedded (Granovetter, 1985). For
example, Smitka ( 199 1) argues that ‘governance by trust’ is more prevalent in the Japanese
than in the US automobile industry due to, among other things, the existence of suppliers’
associations (kyoryokukai) in Japan and their absence in the USA. These associations enhance
lateral communication among suppliers, and therefore act as an extra bulwark against customer
opportunism (Sako 1996). Dore (1983) and Sako (1992) provide evidence that Japanese
companies are more predisposed to trusting their trading partners than British companies. This
is in part due to prevailing business norms, which are determined by societal-level cultural
values.
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Societal norms may be self-reinforcing. Over time, a history of good experience with
trusting behavior in Japan may have promoted-the diffusion of trust. In fac~ cultural norms
such as trust can be ‘the precipitate of history’ (Dore 1987, p.91 ). For instance, Japanese
suppliers in the automotive industry may trust their customers more today because they have
had more customer commitment, more technical assistance, etc. over a much longer period of
time than most US suppliers, and their trusting behavior has been honored by being given
growing orders, In contrast, a typical (though more eloquent) US supplier executive asserted
that their customer ‘would steal a dime from a starving grandmother’ (Helper 1991). Attempts
by US companies to imitate the Japanese business norm are costly and difficult because the
way in which a network of customer-supplier relations developed in Japan is path dependent.
Because of the extent to which norms of trustworthy behavior are embedded in a
society, there is no reason to expect the same model of the determinants of trust to hold in each
country (Dore 1983, Sako 1992).1 For this reason, we control for national differences not
only by using a dummy variable in the combined data set, but also by examining the
determinants of trust in each country separately.
By extension, we may also hypothesize that because of this accumulated expectation of
trust among Japanese companies, Japanese-owned suppliers in the USA are likely to trust their
customers more than do other suppliers in the USA. Because of a reputation effect, even US-
owned suppliers may trust Japanese-owned customers more than the Big Three customers.
H7A: Suppliers in Japan tend to have a higher level of trust towards their customer than
suppliers in the US.
H7B: In the US, Japanese-owned suppliers tend to entertain a higher level of trust
towards their customer than do other suppliers.
H7C: In the US, suppliers to Japanese-owned automakers tend to entertain a higher
level of trust towards their customer than do other suppliers.
Customers’ sumlier management pract ices
One caveat to the above generalisation about national culture and business norms is that
suppliers’ trust of customers may be customer-specific, and that within each country some
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customers may be perceived to be more trustworthy than others. For example, within Japan,
the largest producer Toyota has a reputation foihaving been more consistent tha other
Japanese automakers in offering help (e.g. technical assistance on Total Quality, Just-in-Time,
Value Analysis, etc.) which suppliers have found useful (Sako 1996). In the USA, despite a
general trend towards longer-term relationships, General Motors has recently adopted a
purchasing strategy which emphasizes the benefit of hard-nosed bargaining with little
commitment to renew contracts (Helper 1994).
Over time, each customer may develop a reputation for particular procurement practices
among the supplier community. The reputation may be for being receptive to suppliers’
suggestions (rather than unwilling to consider them), or for providing help to reduce costs
(rather than switch immediately to an alternative supplier) whenever a competitor offered a
lower price or when material prices rose. These beliefs on the part of suppliers, whether they
are based on actual past experience with their customer or hearsay, are hypothesized to be
associated with high trust.
This hypothesis can also be seen as a test of whether the concept of inter-organizational
trust makes sense. If it is true that trust can exist only between individuals, and that trustworthy
individuals are randomly allocated across companies, then our data should reject the following
hypothesis:
H8: The supplier’s trust of customers within a country depends on the customer’s
supplier management practices.
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The dataset used to test the above hypotheses were collected by the authors during
1993. For details on questionnaire design, the sampling framework and response rates, see
Appendix A. The data is derived from responses from first-tier component suppliers in the
automotive industry. Although single-industry studies may often lack generalizability, they
have the advantage of controlling for sources of extraneous variation due to industry
characteristics, environmental noise and the like. We solicited answers from one respondent
per organization to make a large-scale international survey feasible (a total of 3(X)O+
questionnaires were sent out).
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Trust and opportunism concern subjective judgments and expectations. We relied on
composite rather than single measures in orde~ to reduce measurement errors. The measures of
trust and opportunism were developed by surveying the academic literature in economics and
psychology (e.g. Anderson 1988, Cook et al 198 1). By contrast, most of the independent
variables used for regression analysis, such as contract lengths and company size, are objective
data and therefore are based on single-item measures.
3.1 Different Types of Trust?
Eight items used to measure trust and opportunism in the questionnaire are shown in
Table 1. Each item is a five-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree
(5). The items were chosen to capture the notion of three types of trust and opportunism. For
example, the concept of ‘contractual trust’ is operationalised by the statement’ We prefer to
have everything spelt out in detail in our contract’. The concept of ‘competence trust’ is
captured by a reversed statement ‘The advice our customer gives us is not always helpfil.’
‘Goodwill trust’ is operationalised by the statements ‘We can rely on our customer to help us in
ways not required by our agreement with them’ and ‘We can depend on our customer always
to treat us fairly.’ Other items were included to capture the notion of opportunism (’Given the
chance, our customer might try to take unfair advantage of our business unit’), the notion of
suspicion (‘We feel that our customer often uses the information we give to checkup on us
rather than to solve problems.’), and distrust arising from lack of shared goals (’In dealing
with this customer, we spend a lot of time haggling unproductively over such issues as prices
and responsibility for problems.’ ). Lastly, although the survey was about suppliers’ trust of
customers, it attempted to gauge the extent of mutual trust by asking suppliers to awess their
own trustworthiness (‘Our business unit has a reputation for being more straightforward and
open with our customer than are other suppliers’ ).
When each item is examined separately, it is evident that Japanese suppliers tend to
entertain a higher level of trust and a lower level of opportunism than US suppliers, except in
their self-assessment of honesty and openness. Within the US, Japanese-owned suppliers and
those which supply to Japanese customers tend to be more trusting and expect less
opportunism from their customers. By contrast, suppliers to General Motors are significantly
more suspicious of their customer. Within Japan, suppliers to Toyota are somewhat more
trusting of their customer, according to a few of the items.
14
..--.. ---- —----- ---. --—-.
Insert Tab]& 1 about here
------------------------------
Next, in order to examine if survey respondents differentiated between different types
of trust, factor analysis was performed on the above items. Principal components analysis
with varimax (orthogonal) rotation was used throughout. Of the eight items listed in Table 1,
one concerning ‘contractual trust’ (‘We prefer to have everything spelt out in detail in our
contract’) was dropped from the factor analysis because including it produced a factor loading
of this item on all factors of below 0.2 in all cases. Table 2 shows that the results are
substantially different in the US and Japanese surveys. In the USA, only one main factor
emerged, which combines 6 items with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.811. This factor may be
labelled Distrust. The suppliers’ self-assessment of their trustworthiness emerged as a separate
factor. In Japan, however, the application of the same technique led to the emergence of three
separate factors: Factor 1 (combining 4 items with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.726) called
Customer Opportunism, Factor 2 (combining 2 items with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.599) called
Goodwill Trust, and one item as a separate indicator of Competence Trust.z Next, the US and
Japanese surveys were combined to perform factor analysis on the overall dam As shown in
Table 2, one main factor, Distrust, which is the same as the US-only factor of Distrust, was
identified, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.816.
----------------------------- -
Insext Table 2 about here
.- ----------------------------
Thus, it seems from these results that as compared to US suppliers, Japanese suppliers
distinguish among different types of trust. Moreover, as the Goodwill Trust Factor in the
Japanese data indicates, reciprocity appears to be more embedded in the Japanese
conceptualisation of trust than the US counterpart. In the Japanese dam opportunism and trust
are not mere opposites; if they were, only one factor should have emerged from the above
anal ysis. (See Deutsch 1958 & 1960 who argues that trust and suspicion are not mere
opposites.) By contrast, in the US, generalized distrust appears to prevail, possibly because
distrust is self-perpetuating; distrust in one area (e.g. contractual) may induce distrust in
another area (e.g. competence) due to the lack of information necessary in order to assess the
source of misconduct.
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3.2 Conditions for Facilitating Trust and Attenuating Opportunism
How different are the factors which attenuate opportunism from those factors which
enhance trust? Moreover, are there any differences in the facilitating conditions for trust in
Japan and the USA?
The eight sets of hypotheses in the previous section were tested using ordinary least
squares regression, with Distrust, Customer Opportunism and Goodwill Trust as alternative
dependent variables.j The independent variables are explained in detail in Appendix B. As the
correlation matrices in the appendix show, there is no probiem with multicollinearity. Note that
coefficients of the regression equations shown in the subsequent Tables are standardized (i.e.
all variables were standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one before regressions
were run).
First, the US and Japanese datasets are combined to test the eight sets of hypotheses.
Next, we focus our analysis on the question of whether determinants of trust are different from
those of opportunism. We also test for a meta-hypothesis that more independent variables are
significant in determining trust and opportunism in a ‘freewill’ than in a ‘constrained’ situation.
Lastly, we deal with the Japanese and US datasets separately to test the hypothesis that the
structural models of trust and opportunism are different in the two countries.
Overall Results
An overall multivariate regression analysis was conducted in order to test the relative
importance of the eight sets of hypotheses. For each hypothesis, a set of relevant independent
variables were regressed against the dependent variable, DISTRUST. Note that DISTRUST is
a generalized form which conflates some notion of customer opportunism and the absence of
trust. As shown in Table 3, the model fits the data reasonably well, with an adjusted Rzof4170
which is excellent by the standards of cross-sectional research. All the hypotheses were
sustained except for H4 (asset specificity and interdependence). Below is a brief summary of
We regression results for each hypothesis.
--------------------- --------
Insert Table 3 about here
------------ —----------------
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H 1: As predicted, vertical integration (OWNERj does not have a significant effect on the level
of distrust. There was also weak, yet significant, result that longer contract length
(CONTRACT) increases distrust, contrary to the prediction (see later for an explanation).
H2: As predicted, the longer suppliers expect their customer’s commitment (COMMm) to last,
the lower the degree of distrust. But the duration of trading to date @IUDING) does not have
a separate effect on distrust.
H3: The act of customers providing information to suppliers (CUSTINFO) in itself reduces
distrust. However, the gap between suppliers’ information to their customers and customers’
information to suppliers (INFODIF) has an independent impact. As predicte~ the more
suppliers are asked to provide information to customers without reciprocation, the higher the
level of suppliers’ distrust in customers.
H4: A high switching cost on the part of customers (CUSWICH) does not affect distrust
significantly. The degree of asset specificity on the part of the supplier (ATSPEC) does not
have a significant impact, nor does the extent of interpdendence (INTDEP) between the
customer and the supplier.
H5: As predicted, the more technical assistance (TECHG) is provided by the customer, the
lower the supplier’s distrust. However, the size of the supplier relative to the customer
(COMPSIZE) had no significant effect on the level of distrust.
H6: Uncertainty (UNCERT) has a highly significant effect on increasing suppliers’ distrust of
customers. But neither uncertainty and asset specificity combined (TCE) nor the technical
complex of the product exchanged (COMPLEX) has a significant impact on distrust.
H7: In order to examine the differential impact of ownership and location, a set of dummy
variables were constructed with the US-owned suppliers with US customers located in the US
as the base-line reference group. First, as the coefficient on the durnrny variable, JAPJAPJ,
indicates, the location of suppliers is highly significant: suppliers located in Japan exhibit a
much lower !evel of distrust than those in the US. Within the US, suppliers which traded with
Japanese automakers (USJAP and JAPJAPU) distrust them less, whether the suppliers
themselves were Japanese-owned or US-owned. At the same time, Japanese*wned suppliers
with US customers (JAPUS) entertained a level of distrust which was not significantly
different from US-owned suppliers with US customers. Evidently, the nationality of
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ownership of customers matters more than the nationality of ownership of suppliers. Even
after taking account of ownership and location, we found that US suppliers considered General
Motors to be particularly distrustful.
H8: As predicted, suppliers’ expectations about customers’ supplier management practices had
an impact on distrust. The survey asked suppliers about possible customer reactions in
different hypothetical situations. In particular, suppliers’ expectations that their suggestions
would be welcomed without reservation and that benefits arising from the suggestions would
be shared (SUGGEST) were associated with low distrust. Also, if a competitor offered a
lower price for a product of equal quality, the customer practice of helping suppliers to match
competitor’s efforts (rather than swich to the competitor) (HELP) was associated with less
distrust. Lastly, in the event that a materials supplier raised its prices, the customer practice of
providing significant help to reduce costs and of allowing full or partial pass-through of the
supplier’s cost increases (rather than holding the supplier to its original price) (PASS) was not
found to affect distrust significantly in the multiple regression analysis.
------------------------ ------
Insert Table 3 about here
----------------------- -------
~ and ni
Table 3 also shows separate regressions for Customer Opportunism and Goodwill
Trust. As predicted, the determinants of trust and opportunism are not the same. In particular,
the customer’s provision of technical assistance to suppliers, interpretted as ‘credible
commitment’ and a ‘gift’, enhances trust but does not function as a safeguard against
opportunism. A type of information asymmetry -- suppliers providing much more information
to customers than customers provide suppliers -- increases customer opportunism but does not
affect goodwill trust adversely.
One way of exploring this issue of different determinants for trust and opportunism
further is to dktinguish between trustworthy customer behavior when a ‘freewill’ choice exists
and the same trustworthy customer behavior which is however predictable due to constraints put
upon the customer. In other words, only if customers can behave in many different ways
would the notion of trust become interesting, and it is the determinants of trust in such
unconstrained circumstances that are of interest here. We hypothesize that when customers are
free rather than constrained or ‘enslaved’, more of the variations in suppliers’ trust in customers
can be explained by the independent variables.A
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Our sample can be divided into subsamples, one with ‘constrained’ customers and the
other with ‘freewill’ customers using the CUSWICH variable, measuring the number of
months it would take the customer to replace the supplier with another supplier. Since the
median month was 8 months, those with more than 8 months were classified as ‘constrained’
(41 % of the total sample), and those with 8 months or less as ‘free’ (59% of the total sample).s
Table 4 shows the results of regressions of GOODWTLL TRUST and CUSTOMER
OPPORTUNISM using these subsamples.
--------------------------- ---
Insert Table 4 about here
-------- -.---—- -------------
Customers’ provision of information to suppliers (cUS’TINFO) and technical
assistance (TECHG) stand out as two variables which are significant in determining trust when
customers are ‘free’ but not when they are ‘constrained’. This implies that when customers
have different alternatives (including behaving distrustfully), the provision of information and
technical assistance signals their commitment to behave in a trustworthy manner. When
customers are constrained, information provision and technical assistance do not matter in
creating suppliers’ trust.
With respect to customer opportunism, the distinction between ‘constrained’ and ‘free’
situations illustrates the following two points which are noteworthy. First, as expected, many
more safeguards against opportunism matter in the ‘free’ than in the ‘constrained’ situation. In
particular, the minimisation of information asymmetry (lNFODIF) and technical assistance
(TECHG) are all significant in reducing customer opportunism in the ‘free’ subsample but not
in the ‘constrained’ subsample. Thus, these credible commitments are worth making only if
customers find it relatively easy to replace their existing suppliers quickly. Second, consistent
with transaction cost theory, the combination of uncertainty and asset specificity leads suppliers
to expect customers to behave opportunistically in the ‘free’ situation but not in the
‘constrained’ situation.
Differences between Jauan and the US
Thus far, we have assumed that there are no US-Japanese differences in the
determinants of trust and opportunism, other than those which can be captured by country-
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specific dummy variables. However, as mentioned in the discussion of the hypothesis H7 on
national differences, we will now examine the &Mtditythatdeterminants of trust and
opportunism may be different between the US and Japan.
One standard approach to exploring whether the structural model of trust and
opportunism is different between the US and Japan is to apply Chow tests (Johnston 1972,
p.2 192-207; Kennedy 1992, pp. 108-9& 224). First, in order to test whether the US and
Japanese datasets are poolable per se, the Chow test was applied to regressions with Distrust,
Goodwill Trust and Customer Opportunism as alternative dependent variables. The test was
significant in all three cases, with F( 18,814)=5.83 significant at 0.1 % in the case of Distrust,
F(17, 812)=1.66 significant at 59%in the case of Goodwill Trust, andF(17,816)=6.48
significant at 0.170 in the case of Customer Opportunism. These results open up the possibility
that the two national samples have distinctly different structural models.
In order to further explore this possibility, we examine separate regressions for the two
countries. The results are shown in Tables 5. Columns 1 and 2 are the regression results for
the Japanese data only, and the dependent variables are Goodwill Trust and Customer
Opportunism, the two factors identified through factor analysis for the Japanese data.
Columns 3 and 4 show the regression results for the US data, using the same Goodwill Trust
and Customer Opportunism factors as dependent variables. What Column 3 shows is the
conditions for enhancing trust in the US, had the same concept of goodwill trust as in Japan
existed in the US. Similarly, Column 4 shows the conditions for attenuating customer
opportunism if the same concept of customer opportunism as in Japan existed in the US. Only
significant differences are reported below.
-------------------- ----------------
Insert Table 5 about here
-----------------------------------
(al US-JaQanese d~ffererices in the determinants of oDuortun Srqi
The three aspects of long-termism have different impacts in Japan and the US. Column
2 of Table 5 shows that in Japan, the results areas expected. The duration of written contracts
has no significant impact on Customer Opportunism because in the Japanese automotive
indust~, there tend not to be product-specific contracts, and the framework contract is typically
renewed annually. Japanese customers therefore have not used contract length to make
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credible commitments for long-term trading. Instead, suppliers appear to base their
expectations of future customer commitment on the history of long-term trading to date
(TRADING).
By contrast, in the US, all the three variables of long-terrnism are significant, and the
results for two out of the three variables are counter-intuitive. A longer duration of written
contract is associated with a- degree of Customer Opportunism. Moreover, the longer
the history of trading to date (TRADING), the higher the level of opportunism. At the same
time informal commitment (COMMIT) reduces opportunism. What appears to be happening in
the USA is that suppliers with only a recent record of trading to date are given longer duration
contracts than suppliers with a long history of trading with the same customev the median
contract length was 3 years for those with a record of supplying the customer for 4 years or
less, as compared to one year for those with a record of supplying the customer for over 40
years. This contract duration is used by suppliers as a basis for projecting future customer
commitment. Either, written contracts are not attenuating opportunistic behavior in the USA,
contrary to transaction cost theory, or longer duration contracts are implemented in response to
rampant opportunism. The cross-sectional nature of the dataset at hand cannot distinguish
between the two possibilities. But it appears that given the past adversarial nature of relations
in the US, long-term suppliers have had more experience of opportunism than have newer
suppliers. Thus, long-term trading or repeated games are not sul%cient to bring about trust in
relationships (cf. Axelrod 1984, Gulati 1995).
(b) U$JaDanese differences in the determinants of IUS{t
Comparing Columns 1 an 3 in Table 5, it is evident that technical assistance (TECHG)
is highly significant in enhancing trust in Japan but not in the US. Similar notions of customer
help and expectations of cost sharing (HELP, PASS) create trust but again in Japan only.
In Japan, but not in the US, longer written contracts (CONTRACI’) are associated with
lower goodwill trust. This lends support to the notion that contracts breed and institutionalise
suspicion. In other words, in Japan, while written contracts are not used to contain customer
opportunism, they undermine goodwill trust.b
(c) Within-Jauan differences m the determiw of trust @@2pWWlIMlll
There are also other differences in the determinants of trust and those of opportunism
within Japan where after all the two were regarded as distinct and not as mere opposites.
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First, greater information asymmetry (with the supplier asked to provide information
without much reciprocation from the customer) (INFODIF) is found to increase opportunism
as expected. In other words, if customers provide as much information to suppliers as
suppliers do customers, the resulting ability of the suppliers to monitor customer behaviour
leads to a reduction in customer opportunism. But INFODIF is also found to enhance trust.
This counter-intuitive result may be picking up a mixture of factors; for one, the provision of
information in itself is not sufficient to generate trust because it is the ways in which
information is used (or abused) which matters. Also, suppliers may be willing to provide much
information because of the goodwill trust which exists in the relationship.
Second, technical assistance by customers to suppliers significantly enhances trust in
Japan, while its effect on dampening customer opportunism is not significant. Thus, there is
evidence that this form of commitment made by customers, and the loose reciprocity which
results from it, enhances trust but is deficient as a safeguard against customer opportunism.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The following main conclusions can be drawn from this study.
First, the conceptualisation of trust and opportunism was found to be different for the
US and the Japanese suppliers, with the latter group demonstrating a greater capacity to
distinguish among different types of trust. Because of this distinction, Japanese suppliers also
conceptualised trust and opportunism not to be mere opposites.
Second, the surveys provided empirical support for the eight sets of hypotheses
advanced in the paper. The conditions which facilitated the creation and sustenance of trust --
and the containing of opportunism -- were found to include long-term commitment,
information exchange, technical assistance, and customer reputation. Vertical integration was
found not to have a significant effect on attenuating customer opportunism in the multivariate
analysis. Thus, equity holding of suppliers by customers gives rise to varying levels of
opportunism or trust depending on other supplier management techniques (such as information
sharing, supplier suggestions and technical assistance) which are practiced in specific
relationships.
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Third, Japanese suppliers were more tnisting than US suppliers, even tier taking
account of these universal facilitating conditions. Within the US, having Japanese customers,
but not the Japanese ownership of the suppliers themselves, had an impact on reducing
distrust. Also General Motors continues to be perceived as a distrustful customer in all
regressions. This indicates that even with all the usual safeguards against opportunism, GM
has not been successful in convincing its suppliers that its commitments are credible.
Fourth, the US-Japanese differences lie not only in the conceptualisation of trust and
the different levels of trust, but also in the determinants of trust and opportunism. In
particular, the length of past trading to date and the length of written contracts were associated
with greate[ opportunism in the US. The US automotive experience has historically been
negative and this bias in expectations is carried forward to cu~ent practices. This is a worrying
phenomenon because future expectations are often extrapolated from the past. This may be a
reason why customers’ informal commitment into the future has to be backed up by long-term
written contracts for the commitment to be credible in the US. By contrast, written contracts
were found to be an irrelevant governance mechanism in Japan in so far as its impact on
opportunism was concerned. Contracts, however, was associated with lower goodwill trust in
Japan, lending support to the view that they institionaiize suspicion.
Fifth, this study found that the determinants of trust and those of opportunism are
different. The survey data provides some evidence for this especially in Japan where trust and
opportunism were found to be distinct concepts. In particular, as expected, technical assistance
by customers is important for enhancing goodwill trust but not as a safeguard against customer
opportunism.
Lastly, trust and opportunism are valid concepts only in situations where actors can
choose from alternative courses of action. This study gives support to this notion. We find in
particular that customers’ provision of information to suppliem and technical assistance are
significant in enhancing trust and attenuating customer opportunism only in cases whe~
customers are ‘free’, but not when they are ‘constrained’ by market structure or technology. In
other words, customers can be made to behave in a predictably trustworthy or non-
opportunistic manner if they cannot replace their existing suppliers easily, regardless of other
factors. It is when easily accessible alternative suppliers exist that suppliers give careful
consideration to safeguards against opportunism and enhancers of trust.
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NOTES
1. For example, in our field research, we found that US firms considered it untrustworthy
for a customer to ask for a price reduction on an existing product, and considered it quite
acceptable to win a contract through a low bid and then ask for a price increase later. In
contrast, Japanese suppliers were used to reducing prices on their products; their customers
considered it untrustworthy to ask for a price increase.
2. Factor analysis was also conducted by excluding the item on suppliers’ self-assessment
of their trustworthiness (‘Our business unit has a reputation for being more straightforward and
open with our customer than are other suppliers.’). A single factor emerged for the US
sample, but two distinct factors were identified in the Japanese sample. This reinforces the
evidence that US and Japanese suppliers conceptualise trust differently.
3. OLS and ordered probit regressions were also run using single item measures rather
than composite measures derived from factor analysis. Similar results (with respect to signs
and significance of independent variables) were obtained as between Customer Opportunism
and the measure ‘Given the change, our customer might take unfair advantage of our business
unit’, and between Goodwill Trust and the measure ‘We can rely on our customer to help us in
ways not required by our agreement with them.’
4. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this distinction.
5. Just to make sure that neither of the subsamples consisted predominantly of US or
Japanese suppliers, it was checked that 40.4% of the US sample and 42.570 of the Japanese
sample are in the ‘constrained’ subsample.
6. These results in the US-Japanese differences are also underpinned by the dummy
variable variant of the Chow test (Kennedy 1992, p.224). The latter shows that the differences
between the US and Japanese datasets lie in the dummy intercept and the slope coeftlcients for
CONTRACT, TECHG, and HELP.
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APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT AND DATA COLLIXHON
Data were collected by the authors during 1993 from 675 fret-tier automotive
component suppliers in the US and 472 first-tier suppliers in Japan, according to the following
procedure.
Questionnaire Design
A questionnaire was developed in English and Japanese, in order to enquire into a
broad range of questions concerning the nature of suppliers’ relationship with their customers,
the vehicle manufacturers. Because many companies supply their customers with several
different types of products, and their relationships with their customers differ by product, we
made a decision to ask respondents to answer the questionnaire for their most important
customer regarding one product which was typical of their company’s output and with which
they were familiar.
Many of the questions were taken from an earlier survey undertaken by Helper in North
America in 1989 (Helper 1991) and a short questionnaire on trust and opportunism
administered by Sako in the electronics industry in Japan and Britain in 1988-9 (SaJco 1992).
In particular, the measures of trust and opportunism were developed by surveying the academic
literature in economics and psychology (e.g. Anderson 1988, Cook et al 1981). We took the
view more common in psychology than in economics that creating composite measures of trust
and opportunism would reduce measurement error, as compared to using a single measure.
Thus, the questionnaire adopted a number of scales, each reflecting different types of trust and
opportunism.
Pi lotting the Questionnaire
Next, the draft questionnaire was sequentially piloted at a handful of supplier
companies in both the USA and Japan during 1992. As a result, improvements were made to
the clarity of questions and the ease of answering them. Much attention was paid to the
phrasing of questions in a vocabulary familiar to managers, and to the consistency of meaning
in the English and Japanese languages. For instance we asked several people to translate some
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questions from English to Japanese and others to translate them back from Japanese into
English. The process of piloting and revision tiook around nine months.
Sampling Framework
The sample chosen for the North American questionnaire was every automotive
supplier and automaker component division named in the Elm Guide to Automotive Sourcing
(available from Elm, Inc. in East Lansing, Michigan). This guide lists the major first-tier
suppliers (both domestic and foreign-owned) to manufacturers of cars and light trucks in the
United States and Canada.
In Japan, the sample consisted of all members of the Japan Auto Parts Industries
Association (JAPIA), all automotive suppliers named in Nihon no Jidoshu Buhin Kogyo
1992/1993 (Japanese Automotive Parts Industry) (published by Auto Trade Journal Co. Inc.
and JAPLA, Tokyo, 1992), and the component divisions of vehicle manufacturers. This
publication lists all the first-tier suppliers (both domestic and foreign-owned) to the eleven
manufacturers of cars and trucks in Japan.
The target respondent in the US was the divisional director of sales and marketing, and
the divisional business manager or director of strategic planning in the case of components
divisions of vehicle manufacturers. Since they commonly take a lead in interfacing with
customers, they were deemed the most knowledgeable informants about customers’
procurement practices. Similarly in Japan, the questionnaire was sent to the Director of Sales
and Marketing at independent firms. For member companies of JAPIA, the survey was sent to
the main contacts named by JAPI.A, many of whom were either chief executives or marketing
directors. JA.MA (Japan Auto Manufacturers Association) took responsibility to identify the
respondents for automaker components divisions.
Response Rates
The questionnaires were sent out in spring 1993 in the US and summer 1993 in Japan.
The responses were far above the norm for business surveys. It was 5570 in North America
and 30% in Japan (4570 among JAPIA members), after taking into account those firms which
were unreachable (mail sent to them was returned undelivered), and those which were not
eligible to answer the survey (they were not first-tier automotive suppliers, or they specialised
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in supplying for heavy truck and buses). The respondents had a wealth of experience, and
were thus the single individual able to answer all of our questions for the customer/product
paire they chose. US respondents averaged more than 18 years in the automobile industry and
more than 11 years with their company. Japanese respondents had worked for 22 years on
average at their company.
We tested for non-response bias in several ways. First, we compared the characteristics
of those who returned the survey to those of the entire population. On the characteristics for
which data was available (size and location) no significant differences were found. The survey
respondents were also divided into 2 groups based on response date. The hypothesis was that
those who responded only after the second follow-up mailing might have more in cornrnon
with those who did not respond at all than those who responded early. This test showed no
significant differences for early and late responders on any of the measures used in this paper.
(We judged statistical significance in both cases using a 10% cutoff).
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Appendix B Explanations of Independent Variables
This appendix provides the survey question and explains any manipulation made subsequently
to create each independent variable.
VARIABLE NAMES
OWNER
CONTRACT
T’MDING
COMMIT
SUPINFO
‘Please describe the ownership of your business unit.
Independent of automaker
100% subsidiary of an automaker
Partially owned by an automaker
(percentage of automaker ownership)’
Ranges from O (for ‘independent of automaker) to 100.
‘What is the length of your written contractor purchase order with this
customer for this product?’ (in years)
‘Approximately how long has your firm sold products in this product
line to this customer?
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5-10 years 11-19 years 20-40 years
41-60 years over 60 years’
The mid-point of each interval was used; thus the variable takes the
values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 7.5, 15, 30, 50.5, and 75.
‘For how long do you think there is a high probability that your
business unit will be supplying this or similar item to your customer?’
(in years)
‘What types of information does your business unit provide to your
customer about the process you use to maker the product you listed
above? (Please check all that apply.)
- Detailed breakdown of process steps
- Cost of each process steps
- Financial information not publicly available
- Production scheduling information
- Type of equipment used
- Your sources of supply
- Detailed information regarding materials you use’
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The seven information iterns were given one point each if checked, and
were added.
CUSTINFO ‘Does your customer provide you with any of the following types of
information? (Please check all that apply.)
- Warranty or other data from final consumers
- Financial information not publicly available
- Information on how your product is used in their process’
The information items were given one point each if checked, and added.
INFODIF
TECHG
SUFINFO - CUSTINFO
‘Over the last four years, what sorts of technical assistance have you
received from your customer? (Please check all that apply, and indicate
whether ‘provided for zero or nominal charge’ or ‘provided for a fee’ )
- Provided personnel who visited supplier site
to aid in implementing improved procedures
- Arranged for training of your personnel at their site
- Provided personnel who worked two weeks or more
on your shopfloor to improve your process’
Given a weight of 2 if ‘provided for zero or nominal charge’ and a
weight of 1 if ‘provided for a fee’, and summed over the three items.
COMPSIZE ‘What is the approximate total number of employees at your business
unit in 1992?’
CUSWICH
ATSPEC
‘Please estimate the number of months it would take your customer to
replace your business unit with another supplier. Consider the time
required to locate, qualifi, train, make investments, tesL and develop a
working relationship with anotherfm. Please exclude legal
considerations such as the existence of long-term contracts.
O 1-3 4-12 13-24 25-48 48+’
The mid-point of each interval was used. The variable therefore takes a
value of O, 2, 8, 18.5, 36.5 and 72.
‘If you were to stop getting these orders from this customer,
approximately how much of your investment for this product in plant,
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INTDEP
UNCERT
equipment, and training would you be unlikely to find alternative uses
for and have to write off?
10% or less 11-33% 34-66% 67-89% 90- 100%’
Again, the mid-point of each interval was used (5, 22,50,78, and 95).
Each supplier is, however, diversified in sectors outside the car industry
to a varying degree. In order to derive the extent of asset specificity
which is company wide, the above proportions were multiplied by the
percent of the supplier’s sales which end up as original equipment for
cars or light trucks.
CUSWICH * ATSPEC
‘In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding
the following factors? (A 1-5 Likert scale ( l=fairly certain;
5=completely unpredictable))
- Customer’s production schedule 2 weeks ahead
- Customer’s production schedule 1 year ahead
- Customer’s final product specifications before Job 1
- Customer’s final product specifications after Job 1‘
(Job 1 is the first mass production batch, after pre-production test runs)
- The supplier’s production costs over 4 years
- Production technology for this product over 4 years
The scores for the six items were summed.
TCE UNCERT * ATSPEC
COMPLEX ‘Please estimate the technical complexity involved in manufacturing this
product’ Used a 1-5 scale ( I=fairly simple; 5=highly complex).
SUGGEST ‘Suppose your business unit has an idea that would allow you to reduce
your costs, but would require your customer to make a slight
modification in its procedures. How would your customer react?
(Please check all that apply.)’
A dummy with 1 if ‘Customer eagerly solicits such suggestions’ and
‘Customer would adopt the suggestion and would w seek to capture
most of the savings’, O otherwise.
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HELP
PASS
USJAP
JAPUS
JAPJAPU
JAPJAPJ
GM
TOYOTAJ
‘How would your customer react if one of your competitors offered a
lower price for a product of equal quality?
A dummy with 1 if ‘Help you match competitors’ efforts’, but not
‘Switch at end of contract’, nor ‘swich as soon as technically feasible’
‘How would your customer react if your. material suppliers raised their
prices?’
A dummy with 1 if ‘Provide significant help for your business unit to
reduce costs’, but not ‘Hold you to your original price’, Ootherwise.
This is meant to capture the notion of customer help and sharing of
costs.
A dummy with 1 for US-owned suppliers with a Japanese customer in
the US, O otherwise.
A dummy with 1 for Japanese-owned suppliers with a US customer in
the US, O othenvise.
A dummy with 1 for Japanese-owned suppliers with a Japanese
customer in the US, Ootherwise.
A dummy with 1 for Japanese suppliers in Japan, Ootherwise.
A dummy with 1 for US suppliers supplying to General Motors.
A dummy with 1 for Japanese suppliers supplying to Toyota in Japan.
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DESCWFI’IVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRJX
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TABLE 1: Differences in Trust and Opportunism in Japan and the USA (Percent agreeing)
Japan vs USA IN JAPAN IN USA fN USA IN USA
N=472;N=675 TOYOTA JAPCUST JAPOWN GM
(N=103) (N=92) (N=75) (N=242)
JAPAN USA No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Wefeel that our customer often uses the information we give to
check up on us, rather than to solve problems.
The advice our customer gives us is not always helpful.
We prefer to have everything spelt out in detail in our contract.
Given the chance, our customer might try to take unfair advantage of
our business unit.
In dealing with this customer, we spend a lot of time haggling
unproductively over such issues as prices and responsibility for
problems.
Wecan rely on our customer to help us in ways not required by our
agreement with them.
Our business unit has a reputation forbeingmore straightforward
and open wi[h our customer than are other suppliers.
Wecan depend on our customer always to treat us fairly.
1.72*** 2.67
2.51*** 3.37
3.08** 3.74
1.90*** 2.87
2.05*** “-z’2.74
3.17* 3.02
3.49*** 3.73
3.91 *** 2.97
1.75 1.62
2.61 2.17***
3.15 2.84**
1.97 1.69t
2.13 1.79***
3.13 3.33t
3.47 3.56
3.85 4.11**
2.74 2.23***
3.42 3.06*
3.81 3.24***
2.97 2.19****
2.80 2.28***
2.92 3.73***
3.73 3.75
2.84 3.85***
2.70 2.48t
3.40 3.16
3.79 3.37***
2.92 2.52**
2.78 2.44**
2.96 3.46***
3.72 3.87
2.88 3.54***
2.55 2.89***
3.25 3.59**
3.68 3.85*
2.63 3.30***
2i58 3.02***
3.26 2.60***
3.74 3.73
3.33 2.31 ***
Note: The figures show the average scores for responses on a I-5 scale (5=strongly agree; 4=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 2=disagrce; I=strongly disagree). T-1est is significant at
*** PC .Oo1 **P< .01 *p< .05 t p<.lo
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TABLE 2: FactorAnalysis of Trust Scales in Japan and the US
USA JAPAN USA &
(N=630) (N*s) JAPAN (N= I073)
———
FACTOR 1 FCTR 2 FCTR 1 FCTR 2 FCTR 3 FCTR 1 FCTR 2
We feel that our customer often uses the
information we give to check upon us rather
than to solve problems.
The advice our customer gives us is not
always helpful.
Given the chance, our customer might try to
take unfair advantage of our business unit.
In dealing with this customer, we spend a lot
of time haggling unproductively over such
issues as prices and responsibility for
problems.
We can rely on our customer to help us in
ways not required by our agreement with
them.
Our business unit has a reputation for being
more straightforward and open with our
customer than are other suppliers.
We can depend on our customer always to
treat us fairly.
Distrust
0.60503
0.39588
0.81950
0.68365
-0.61820
-0.14842
-0.74042
0.81I
0.12658
-0.02763
0.00883
0.07649
0.16127
0.17452
0.15150
Customer
Opportun-
ism
0.37895
0.23556
0.71744
0.71289
0
-0.13264
-0.12673
-0.56046
0.726
Goodwill
Tmst
-0.04483
-0.20108
-0.10321
-0.07189
0.56331
0.59547
0.35477
0.599
Compet-
ence Trust
0.31211
0.28699
0.07664
0.06598
0.04835
-o. I 1507
-0.03758
Distrusi
0.64480
0.45445
0.82441
0.71701
-0.41088
-0.05079
-0.71806
0.02903
-0.08273
-0.08989
-0.06391
0.40548
0.36242
0.25394
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
TABLE 3
Regression Coefficients on Distrust, Customer Opportunism and Goodwill Trust
Distrust Customer Goodwill Trust
Opportunism
OWNER -0.017 -0.017 0.034
CONTRACT o.049t o.054t
-0.026
TIL4DING 0.014 0.018 0.002
COMMIT -o.053t -0.064*** 0.044
CUSTINFO -o.054t -0.029 0.051
INFODIF 0.095*** 0.089** -0.002
CUSWICH -0.009 -0.051 t -0.004
ATSPEC -0.061 -0.157 -0.008
INTDEP -0.033 ----- 0.075
TECHG -O.1OO*** -0.035 O.I1O**
COMPSIZE 0.038 0.059 -0.021
UNCERT 0.232*** 0.191*** -0.124***
TCE 0,098 0.222* -----
COMPLEX -0.024 -0.005 -0.007
USJAP -o.044t -0.042 0.041
JAPUS 0.021 0.001 0.021
JAPJAPU -0.055* -0.042
JAPJAPJ -0.230 -0.202*** * -;.g
SUGGEST -0.175*** -0.136*** O.1O3**
HELP -o. 100*** -0.086*** 0.07 1*
PASS -0.030 -0.006 0.139***
GM 0.166*** 0.138*** -0.154***
TOYOTAJ 0.046 -0.028 0.037
Adjusted Rz 0.41 0.31 0.14
N 850 844 845
*** p<.ool ** p<.ol * p<.05 T p<.lo
N.B. The dependent variable for Customer Opportunism is: ‘Given the chance, our customer
might try to take unfair advantage of our business unit.’
The dependent variable for Goodwill Tmst is: ‘We can rely on our customer to help us
in ways not required by our agyeement with them.’
The table reports OLS regression results. Ordered probit analysis for Customer
Opportunism and Goodwill Trust shows that the identical set of independent variables
as for OLS are significant.
INTDEP = CUSWICH * ATSPEC
TCE = UNCERT “ ATSPEC
TABLE 4
Regmsion Coefficients on Goodwill Trust and Customer Opportunism
in Constrained and Free Conditions
~~ ~~
Goodwill
~~—
Trust Customef Opportunism
Constrained Free Constrained Free
OWNER 0.036
~—
0.011
-0.079 -0.044
Corvrlucr 0.035 o.090t
TRADING
COMMIT
CUSTINFO
KNFODIF
CUSWICH
ATSPEC
mEP
COMPSIZE
UNCHtT
m
COMPLEX
USJAP
JAPUS
JAPJAPU
JAPJAPJ
SUGGESI’
PASS
GM
TOYOTAJ
Adjusted R2
N
-0.082
-0.027
0.063
-0.003
0.026
-0.109
-0.061
0.189
0.080
0.007
-0.136**
-----
0.077
0.033
-0.040
0.158***
-0.017
-0.041
0.018
0. 179***
-0.206***
0.005
0.14
343
-0.023
0.016
o.073t
0.037
0.051
0,040
-0.040
0.140**
-0.039
-O.1O1*
----.
-0.067
0.038
0.010
-0.020
-0.078
0.127**
0.144***
0.118**
-0.129*
0.070
0.13
502
-o.097-t
-0.072
-0.012
0.051
-0.039
0.014
-----
0.027
0.053
0.282***
-0.114
0.035
-0.099*
-0.059
-0.101*
-o.121t
-0.208***
-0.078~
0.044
0. 160**
-0.035
0.33
343
0.029
-0.090*
-0.048
-0.036
0.128**
-0.026
-0.350*
.----
-o.077t
0.067?
0.150**
0.415**
-0.022
-0.002
0.052
0.035
-0.238***
-0.072~
-O.1O8**
-0.029
0.1 30**
-0.032
0.31
501
*** p<.ool ** p<ool * p<.05 f p<.lo
N.B.
‘Constrained’ if CUSWICH > 8; ‘Free’ otherwise.
Goodwill Trust: ‘We can rely on our customer to help us in ways not required by our agreement
with them.’
Customer Opportunism: ‘Given the chance, our customer might try to take unfair advantage of our
business unit.’
Ordered probit for the last two columns led to the same set of independent variables being
significant in each regression.
TABLE 5
Regression Coefficients on Customer Opportunism and Goodwill Trust
in the US and Japan Separately
Goodwill Customer Goodwill Customer
Trust Opportunism Trust Opportunism
OWNER 0.063 0,004 -0.001 -0.047
CONITUCT
TRADING
coMMIT
CUSTINFO
INFODIF
CUSWICH
ATSPEC
INTDEP
TECHG
COMPSIZE
UNCERT
TCE
COMPLEX
SUGGEST
HELP
PASS
USJAP
JAPUS
JAPJAPU
JAPJAPJ
:3YOTAJ
Adjusted Rz
N
-o.088-t -0.011 -0.019 0.098”
-0.030
0.060
-0.098*
-0.041
0.040
0.008
0.098”
-0.093”
0.061
0.092~
-0.069
0.168***
0.074
0.050
0.0001
0.138***
0.074
0.052
0.034
-0.020
-0.228
0.028
-0.094
0.024
-0.011
-0.090
.-.-------
-0.059
0.061
-0.024
-0.040
-0.048
0.024
0. 128**
-0.065
-0.121*
-----
0.061
0.242**
0.304
0.007
-0.157***
-----
-0.028
0.275***
0.116
-0.020
0.045
0.123*
0.141**
-0. 192***
-0.226***
0.061
0,091*
-0.065
0.073
-0.159***
-0.020
-0.035
0!022
0.041
0.078T
-----
-0.059
-0,012
-0.059
-----
.----
-----
------
-----
-----
---.-
.----
.----
0.184***
---.-
-0.111*
-----
-----
-0.0620.067
0.08
498
0.26
502
0.13
348
0.26
348
*** p<.ool ** p<.ol * p<.05 t p<.lo
